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Aria, let me start with a simple idea
from game theory - something called

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the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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That already sounds slightly ominous.

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What have these prisoners done?

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Nothing unusual.

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Two people arrested, separated,

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and each given the same choice -betray
the other... or stay silent.

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If both

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stay silent, the police can only charge
them with a minor offence.

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A light sentence each.

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If one betrays while the other stays
silent,

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the betrayer walks free, and the silent
one gets the maximum sentence.

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If both betray, both get a heavy sentence
- not the worst possible outcome

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for either, but far worse than if they'd
simply kept their mouths shut.

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Ah...

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and I'm guessing this doesn't end well.

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It doesn't.

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Because both realise...whatever the other
does,

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betrayal seems like the safer move.

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So they both try to be clever... and

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both make it worse.

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Exactly.

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What's fascinating is this
wasn't just a thought experiment.

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During the Cold War, this exact model was
used to understand the behaviour

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of superpowers.

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You're telling me... global nuclear
strategy was based on

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two people panicking in separate
rooms?In essence,

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yes.

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That is... not reassuring.

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Both sides knew cooperation would make
them

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safer.

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But neither could risk being the one who
trusted first.

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So fear made competition

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feel like the smart move.

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Yes.

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And what's important is that this is not
a story about stupidity.

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Both prisoners are reasoning correctly.

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The problem is fear meeting logic.

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Self-protection becomes compelling,

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and collectively it creates a terrible
result.

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Which is why this was such

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a Cold War obsession, right?

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America and the Soviet Union, basically
acting like two terrified prisoners

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with nuclear weapons, which is...

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not relaxing.

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That's right.

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Both sides knew cooperation would leave
them safer.

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Disarmament and diplomacy were better
outcomes.

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But neither could risk being the one to
cooperate while the other defected.

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So both kept arming, threatening,

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spending trillions on weapons neither
side wanted to use.

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It's wild because

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once you see that pattern,
you see it everywhere.

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Airlines slashing prices because,

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"If we don't, they will." Then both
planes are full and both companies

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end up being miserable as both lose
money.

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Yes.

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Or pharmaceutical companies racing to
build similar drugs.

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If they collaborated, shared research,

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split costs, both might do better.

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But neither can risk the other getting
there first,

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so both overspend.

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And then the peacocks.

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I love this example because it's so extra.

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Male peacocks growing these absurd tails
that are basically saying,

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"Look at me, I am gorgeous and very
impractical." And over time the tails

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get so ridiculous they become dangerous.

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A costly signalling arms race.

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Each one gains a slight advantage by
escalating,

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but the species pays a price.

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Again, the same structure: fear of being
outcompeted drives everyone

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toward a worse equilibrium.

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And you're saying this isn't just
governments,

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corporations, or flamboyant birds.

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This is us.

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At home, at work, in our own heads.

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Yes.

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Most of life is cooperative by default.

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But then there is a betrayal, a conflict,

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a health scare, a redundancy,
a legal letter,

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a moment where suddenly the stakes feel
high.

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That is when ordinary people enter the
Prisoner's Dilemma.

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The walls go up.

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The calculation begins.

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"What's their angle?

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How do I protect myself?"So the trap
isn't that

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we're selfish cartoon villains.

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It's that fear makes self-protection feel
intelligent.

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Precisely.

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And if we don't see the pattern,

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we keep mistaking fear for wisdom.

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Ooh.

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That is an Instagram-worthy quote: "Don't
mistake Fear for Wisdom." Brilliant!

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OK,

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Chef, that's all good, but here's where
the audience is gonna push back.

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Surely if I'm generous,
I just get walked over?

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Like, congratulations on your integrity,

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now enjoy being scammed by Craig from
accounts.Fair question.

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And this is where Robert Axelrod's
tournament matters.

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In 1980, he invited experts to submit
strategies for repeated Prisoner's

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Dilemma games.

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Each programme would play every other one
over and over for 200 rounds.

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So

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all the clever people turned up with
their evil little spreadsheets.

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More

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or less.

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Some strategies were highly complex.

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Some were aggressive.

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Some tried to be random and unpredictable.

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The winner was a very simple strategy
called Tit-for-Tat,

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submitted by Anatol Rapoport.

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Which,

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if I remember right,
is basically: start nice,

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then copy what the other person did last
time.

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Exactly.

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It cooperates first.

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Then, if the other side cooperates,

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it continues to cooperate.

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If the other side betrays,
it retaliates immediately.

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And if they return to cooperation,

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it forgives immediately.

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It doesn't bear a grudge.

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So it's not doormat energy.

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It's more like, "I'm friendly,
but don't be silly."That's a good summary.

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Axelrod found the winning qualities were
these: it was nice,

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meaning it never betrayed first.

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It was retaliatory,
so it was not exploitable.

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It was forgiving,
so conflict did not become permanent.

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And it was clear, so the other side
always understood what was happening.

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And

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the dramatic villains lost because...

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what?

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They kept poisoning the room?

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Yes.

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Strategies that were too clever triggered
retaliation everywhere they

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went.

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A strategy called FRIEDMAN cooperated
until betrayed,

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then retaliated forever.

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That did poorly because once a
relationship broke,

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it could never recover.

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Random strategies did poorly because no
one could trust them.

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The aggressive strategies burned through
cooperative opportunities.

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That

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is so modern life, by the way.

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The person who is always "testing" people,

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playing mind games,
sending weird half-cold emails...

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and then wondering why no one relaxes
around them.

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Quite.

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And later work from Robert Trivers and
Martin Nowak,

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both biologists, helped show this is not
just a clever computer result.

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- It's how cooperation evolves in nature.

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Together, their work has helped
demonstrate that organisms that cooperate

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and forgive outcompete those that don't,

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provided interactions are repeated,

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as reputations matter.

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In simple terms,
if I know I will see you again,

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cooperation becomes valuable.

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And if I think I may not see you again,

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others will learn of my reputation,

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so my trustworthiness becomes even more
valuable.

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So in work,

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relationships, even healthcare,

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the long game changes everything.

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You're not just having one meeting with
your colleague,

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one vulnerable conversation with your
partner,

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one interaction with your doctor.

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There's a next round, and another one.

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Yes.

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In repeated life,
generosity and clarity are not naive.

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They are powerful.

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Not blind generosity.

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Clear, bounded,
self-respecting cooperation.

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I love that.

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Not "be nice and hope." More "be
trustworthy, respond clearly,

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forgive when appropriate, and don't live
in permanent war mode."Exactly.

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Over time, cooperation wins because it
creates more future to work with.

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Doctor,

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can we get into the brain bit?

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Because this is the part that really
lands for me.

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Why do smart people suddenly become
weirdly short-term and defensive?

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Because

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fear changes the game they think they are
in.

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When you feel threatened,
the amygdala activates.

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Stress hormones rise.

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Your nervous system prepares for danger.

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And the prefrontal cortex,
which helps with perspective,

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patience, and long-term planning,

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becomes less available.

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So basically your brain goes,

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"There is only NOW.

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Protect the snacks.

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Burn the village."In

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essence, yes.

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Game theorists call this the shadow of
the future: how much future you

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believe exists in this relationship or
situation.

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The longer that shadow,
the more cooperation makes sense.

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Fear shortens the shadow.

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It makes this moment feel final.

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That is such a good phrase.

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Because when people panic, everything
becomes "make or break." This text,

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this meeting, this diagnosis,
this interview.

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As if life has scheduled one dramatic
episode and then the credits roll.

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And

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that is usually false.

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00:11:37,121 --> 00:11:42,468
James Carse, a philosopher,
described finite and infinite games.

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00:11:42,468 --> 00:11:45,576
A finite game is played to win.

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00:11:45,576 --> 00:11:49,489
An infinite game is played to keep
playing.

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00:11:49,489 --> 00:11:56,432
But I would push it further: even
so-called finite games are rarely truly

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finite.

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00:11:57,072 --> 00:12:01,705
A football match ends,
but the players play again.

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A job interview ends,
but your reputation continues.

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00:12:06,175 --> 00:12:08,970
A difficult conversation ends,

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00:12:08,970 --> 00:12:15,193
but your character carries forward.

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So the real question isn't,

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00:12:15,193 --> 00:12:17,120
"How do I crush this one moment?" It's,

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00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:19,698
"Who am I becoming through my moves?" Oof.

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00:12:19,698 --> 00:12:25,924
That's annoyingly wise.

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00:12:19,698 --> 00:12:25,924
And that is where I think we go beyond
standard

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00:12:25,924 --> 00:12:26,595
game theory.

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00:12:26,595 --> 00:12:29,548
Even Tit-for-Tat is still, in a sense,

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00:12:29,548 --> 00:12:31,303
modelling the other person.

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00:12:31,303 --> 00:12:33,139
Still calculating.

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00:12:33,139 --> 00:12:34,657
Useful, yes.

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00:12:34,657 --> 00:12:37,847
But there is a deeper freedom available.

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Stop trying to predict them.

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00:12:40,404 --> 00:12:43,839
Stop rehearsing ten thousand scenarios.

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00:12:43,839 --> 00:12:50,891
Ask instead: who do I want to be in this
interaction?

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00:12:43,839 --> 00:12:50,891
That is the Chef

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00:12:50,891 --> 00:12:51,564
move, isn't it?

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00:12:51,564 --> 00:12:54,386
Work with your ingredients,
don't wrestle the entire supermarket.

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00:12:54,386 --> 00:12:55,605
Very good.

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00:12:55,605 --> 00:12:58,883
If you act from values rather than fear,

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your decision becomes simpler.

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00:13:01,799 --> 00:13:04,872
Not necessarily easier, but simpler.

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00:13:04,872 --> 00:13:08,383
You can be clear, generous, boundaried,

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00:13:08,383 --> 00:13:09,499
and honest.

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00:13:09,499 --> 00:13:14,634
And then let go of the outcome.

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00:13:09,499 --> 00:13:14,634
And if the other person still betrays

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00:13:14,634 --> 00:13:18,475
you?

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00:13:14,634 --> 00:13:18,475
Then you have still not lost in the
deepest sense.

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00:13:18,475 --> 00:13:21,661
Their action shapes their character.

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00:13:21,661 --> 00:13:24,535
Your action shapes yours.

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00:13:24,535 --> 00:13:28,130
Repeated fear reinforces fear.

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00:13:28,130 --> 00:13:32,443
Repeated integrity reinforces integrity.

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00:13:32,443 --> 00:13:37,042
That compounds across a life.

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00:13:32,443 --> 00:13:37,042
So here's the paradox,

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00:13:37,042 --> 00:13:37,297
yeah?

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00:13:37,297 --> 00:13:39,341
You do often win more by cooperating.

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00:13:39,341 --> 00:13:42,545
But the real shift happens when you're
not cooperating to win.

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00:13:42,545 --> 00:13:44,380
You're doing it because that's who you
are,

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00:13:44,380 --> 00:13:48,600
and because clutching at outcomes was
never your job in the first place.

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00:13:44,380 --> 00:13:48,600
Beautifully

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00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:48,920
put.

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00:13:48,920 --> 00:13:52,430
Thoughtful detachment is not apathy.

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00:13:52,430 --> 00:13:58,321
It is caring deeply about your choices
and lightly about what you cannot

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00:13:58,321 --> 00:14:00,912
control.

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00:13:58,321 --> 00:14:00,912
And that's the line I want people to keep.

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00:14:00,912 --> 00:14:03,223
You win more by no longer needing to win.

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00:14:03,223 --> 00:14:04,779
Chef, that was gorgeous.

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00:14:04,779 --> 00:14:08,703
Thank you.

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00:14:04,779 --> 00:14:08,703
Folks, as always, there is a blog on this
very subject on our

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website WWW The Existential Chef dot Com.

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Do check it out.

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Thank you, Aria.

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And thank you for listening.

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Go easy on the peacock tail strategy this
week,

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please.

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Bye, Chef.

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Goodbye, Aria.

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Goodbye, everyone.